State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 24, 1987 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
11-24-1987 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from November 24, 1987 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 
24, 1987 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/354 
#2A-11/24/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 896. AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9439 
CITY OF BATAVIA. 
Respondent. 
SARGENT. REPKA AND COVERT. P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
OSHLAG AND SALEH. ESQS. (JEFFREY D. OSHLAG. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 896, 
AFL-CIO (IAFF) from the dismissal of its improper practice 
charge against the City of Batavia (City). IAFF alleges that 
the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, in May 1987, it reduced the salary 
of fire fighters by 5% without negotiations with their 
bargaining agent. IAFF. 
The City defended against the charge upon the ground 
that the reduction by 5% in the salary of fire fighters was 
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authorized by an interest arbitration award issued on 
October 22, 1985. The arbitration award arose out of an 
impasse over the impact of a mid-contract reduction in 
staffing of fire fighters. The interest arbitration panel 
made the following award concerning the issue: 
The panel awards a 5% salary increase 
effective September 1. 1985. This 5% 
increase will be reduced by 1 1/4% for each 
additional staffing level above 28 until a 
level of 32 is reached. For example, if 
staffing is increased to 30 the 5% would be 
reduced to 2 1/2%. At a level of 32 the 5% 
would be reduced to zero. 
The award makes no mention of its duration as compensation 
for reduced staffing and increased work. 
On April 28, 1987, the City hired 2 new fire fighters, 
and, on May 2. 1987. hired an additional 2 fire fighters, 
raising the complement of staff in the department to 32. 
Commencing with the May 3. 1987 payroll period, the City 
reduced the fire fighters' salaries by 5%. asserting that the 
interest arbitration award authorized it to do so, based upon 
the increased staffing level. 
The IAFF opposed the salary reduction upon the ground 
that the arbitration award, although silent concerning its 
duration, is most reasonably construed as having a one-year 
limit. The IAFF argues that if the award expired prior to 
the salary reduction, the reduction in salary by 5% 
constituted a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Board - U-9439 
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The City argues, on the other hand, that a proper reading 
of §209.4(c)(vi) of the Act requires the conclusion that where 
the arbitration award is silent as to duration, the award is 
effective for a period of two years.— 
The ALJ agreed with the reasoning of the City, and held 
that §209.4(c)(vi) sets the term of an interest arbitration 
award at two years where the award is otherwise silent as to 
its duration. 
We agree with the ALJ that the award contains no language 
from which its term might reasonably be inferred, and we 
further agree that there is no basis for concluding that the 
absence of a "year two benefit" is reasonably construed to 
imply a one-year term, as argued by the IAFF. This type of 
interest arbitration award, which is mid-contract term and 
which concludes impact negotiations over reduced staffing, does 
not lend itself to the same type of analysis, for purposes 
i/section 209.4(c)(vi) of the Act provides as follows: 
[T]he determination of the public arbitration 
panel shall be final and binding upon the 
parties for the period prescribed by the panel, 
but in no event shall such period exceed two 
years from the termination date of any previous 
collective bargaining agreement or if there is 
no previous collective bargaining agreement 
then for a period not to exceed two years from 
the date of determination by the panel . . . . 
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of establishment of its duration, as might be the case with 
an award which concludes usual contract negotiations 
typically involving percentage increases for each year it 
remains in effect. There is no basis upon which it could be 
said that the term of the award is one year. 
We also agree with the ALJ that §209.4(c)(vi) of the Act 
is most reasonably construed as setting a term of two years 
from date of determination by the arbitration panel as the 
term of an award whose term cannot be adduced from its 
language. It is therefore our conclusion that the City acted 
in conformity with the interest arbitration award then in 
effect when, in May 1987. it increased staffing of fire 
fighters to 32 and reduced the salaries of fire fighters by 
2/ 5% concomitantly.— 
On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that the improper 
practice charge fails to allege a violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act inasmuch as it complains that the City applied the 
conditions for reduction and elimination of a 5% salary 
increase while, in fact, it was an application ordered by the 
parties' interest arbitration panel. 
2/see. e.g. . Gananda CSD. 17 PERB 1f3095 (1984). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE. ORDERED that the charge be. and it 
hereby is. dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: November 24, 1987 
Albany, New York 
arold R. Newman. Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member ] 
#2B-11/24/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 252. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION. 
AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
-and- CASE NO. U-9107 
METROPOLITAN SUBURBAN BUS AUTHORITY. 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN. REIF & MEGINNIS. ESQS. (WALTER M. MEGINNISS. 
JR.. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
HELENA E. WILLIAMS. ESQ. (CINDY L..DUGAN. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 252. 
Transport Workers Union. AFL-CIO (TWU) from the dismissal, on 
motion, of its charge that the Metropolitan Suburban Bus 
Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
implementing new drug and alcohol testing procedures and 
related disciplinary penalties for bargaining unit employees. 
In addition to filing an improper practice charge, TWU 
filed a contract grievance against the Authority, alleging 
that the parties' agreement implicitly required the 
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continuation of existing practices concerning testing for 
drug and alcohol use for the duration of the agreement. 
While the improper practice charge was pending, the parties 
proceeded to arbitration on the contract' grievance, which 
resulted in an arbitration award. The arbitrator held that 
there was no specific contract language restricting the right 
of the Authority to promulgate a drug and alcohol testing 
procedure, even though a departure from past practice, and 
that the right of the Authority to engage in random drug and 
alcohol testing falls within the scope of its right to 
discipline or discharge its employees, contained in the 
Management Functions clause- of the parties' agreement. 
The arbitrator accordingly found that the Management 
Functions clause of the parties' agreement specifically 
authorized the Authority to unilaterally implement a random 
drug and alcohol testing program which significantly differed 
from its previous practice. 
i/Article 1. §8 of the parties' agreement, entitled 
"Management Functions." provides as follows: "(a) [to] the 
extent that any such rights are not limited by the 
provisions of this Agreement or any separate agreement 
relating solely to pension matters, the management of the 
affairs of the Authority, the direction and control of its 
property and operations and the hiring, direction, 
promotion, demotion, discipline, discharge and layoff of 
its employees are the exclusive function of the Authority." 
11297 
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Based upon the filing of the contract grievance by the 
TWU. the ALJ found that PERB is without jurisdiction over the 
improper practice charge pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. 
The ALJ further found that, in any event, even if PERB had 
jurisdiction over the charge, it should be dismissed upon the 
ground that deferral to the arbitration award which 
interpreted the parties' agreement is appropriate under the 
standards set forth in NYC Transit Authority. 4 PERB 1P031 
(1971).~f 
As we recently held in Herkimer County BOCES. 20 PERB 
1P050. at p. 3109 (1987): "[D]eferral of the question of 
whether PERB has jurisdiction over an improper practice 
charge when there is a pending contract grievance is a more 
equitable result than outright dismissal of the charge with 
prejudice." Consistent with that holding in Herkimer County 
BOCES. supra, we find that unconditional dismissal of the 
charge exclusively upon the ground that the TWU had filed a 
contract grievance concerning the implementation of the 
.2/ln that case we enunciated, at p. 3670, the 
standards applicable to deferral to an arbitration award. 
They are (a) that the issues raised by the improper 
practice charge were fully litigated in the arbitration 
proceeding, (b) that the arbitration proceedings were not 
tainted by unfairness or serious procedural irregularity, 
and (c) that the arbitrator's determination was not 
"clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies" of the Act. 
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random testing and penalty procedures for drug and alcohol use 
is not required by §205.5(d) of the Act. 
The ALJ went further and held that, even if PERB had 
3/ jurisdiction over the charge, deferral— to the arbitration 
award is appropriate and warrants dismissal of the charge. 
The TWU argues that the arbitration award issued in 
connection with this matter is repugnant to the policies of 
the Act and, accordingly, should not have formed the basis for 
dismissal of the charge. In support of its contention, the 
TWU argues that this Board and the courts have frequently held 
that a broadly worded management rights clause does not give 
. . . 4/ 
rise to a waiver of a union's bargaining rights.— Thus, it 
asserts that an arbitration award interpreting a management 
rights clause must also meet this standard for finding a 
waiver, which has been frequently enunciated by this 
3/Deferral in this sense is understood to mean giving 
substantial weight to, or granting deference to, the 
arbitration award. 
i/See. e.g.. State of New York (SUNY Albany), 10 PERB 
ir4578 (1977), aff'd. 11 PERB 1F3026 (1978); Steuben-Allegany 
BOCES, 13 PERB «|f4511, aff'd, 13 PERB ir3096 (1980); County 
of Rensselaer. 13 PERB 1f3080 (1980). 
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Board and by the courts- before deferral to an arbitration 
award is appropriate. TWU asserts that the standards for a 
finding of waiver were not applied by the arbitrator (since 
the scope and nature of the arbitrator's review differed from 
the scope of review of this Board), that the standards for 
waiver should be applied in the instant case, and that, if 
applied, a finding should be made that the TWU did not waive 
its right to bargain concerning random alcohol and drug 
testing and penalties for drug and alcohol use. 
In Steuben-Allegany BOCES. supra, we held that a general 
management rights clause did not constitute an explicit waiver 
of the right to negotiate concerning employee smoking 
restrictions which had been unilaterally implemented by the 
employer. In that case, the arbitrator denied the employee 
ii/The Appellate Division, Third Department, held in 
CSEA v. Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685. 686. 15 PERB IROll. at 7022 
(3d Dep't 1982). appeal dismissed. 57 N.Y.2d 775. 15 PERB 
ir7020 (1982). that "a waiver must be clear, unmistakable 
and without ambiguity", citing the Court of Appeals in City 
of New York v. State of New York. 40 N.Y.2d 659. 669 
(1976), where the Court defined a waiver as "the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right with both 
knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish 
it . . . ." The standards enunciated by the Third 
Department and by the Court of Appeals have, as the TWU 
points out. been adopted by this Board in numerous cases, 
e.g. County of Genesee. 18 PERB ir3016 (1985); State of New 
York (SUNY Albany). 16 PERB ir3050 (1983). aff'd in part. 61 
N.Y.2d 1001. 17 PERB ir7007 (1984); City of Mt. Vernon. 5 
PERB «|f3057 (1972) . 
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organization's grievance upon the ground that the smoking 
restrictions in issue were reasonable and that, because no 
express and specific contractual restriction appeared 
elsewhere in the parties' agreement, the general management 
rights clause permitted the employer to act. In doing so, we 
recognized that to defer to the arbitration award would have 
resulted in shifting the burden from the employer to negotiate 
before changing terms and conditions of employment, to the 
union to achieve contractual restrictions on such employer 
actions, in contradiction of the policies of the Act. 
Based upon the same reasoning as expressed in 
Steuben-Allegany BOCES. supra, on the facts in this limited 
record, we find that deferral to the arbitration award is not 
warranted. We so find because the standard of review used in 
the context of arbitration was whether the TWU had achieved a 
contractual limitation upon the Authority's otherwise 
unfettered right to act. whereas the standard applicable to 
improper practice charges pursuant to §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
is whether the employer can establish that it negotiated the 
right to act or that the TWU waived its right to negotiate. 
This difference in the nature of the inquiry and burden of 
proof warrants our finding that the Act requires us to make an 
independent review and determination as to whether waiver of 
the right to negotiate took place in this case. This is 
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particularly necessary in view of our recent holding in City 
of Buffalo, 20 PERB 1[3048 (1987). We there held that 
implementation of a random drug testing program affects 
constitutional rights of employees and is accordingly a 
subject over which the employee organization may choose not 
to bargain. Where constitutional rights are at issue, waiver 
of those rights on behalf of bargaining unit members must 
certainly be carefully scrutinized. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that deferral to the 
contractual arbitration award is not appropriate in this 
case, and that this matter should be remanded to the Director 
for further proceedings consistent herewith. 
IT IS. ACCORDINGLY. HEREBY ORDERED that the dismissal of 
the charge is reversed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the charge be. and it hereby 
is, remanded to the Director for further proceedings 
consistent herewith. 
DATED: November 24. 1987 
Albany, New York 
Q 'X^i/'—Kl *—*-*1 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
fc-X -
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
#2C-11/24/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAROLD ALSTON. 
Charging Party, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. 
Respondent. 
HAROLD ALSTON. p_r_p_ se 
ALBERT COSENZA. General Counsel (by RICHARD DREYFUS. 
Assistant General Counsel) for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes before us on the exceptions of the New 
York City Transit Authority (Authority) to an Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALJ) decision, which found that the Authority 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), when it served disciplinary charges 
upon Harold Alston (Alston) for activity protected by the 
Act. 
On August 14. 1986. Alston was accused by an Authority 
supervisor of causing a disruption in service when he stopped 
his empty bus in order to use a bathroom during the course of 
a five-hour. 58 minute run. Notwithstanding Alston's claim 
that he requested and obtained permission by telephone to 
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make a bathroom stop, he was suspended for ten days for this 
infraction. Thereafter, on or about September 24. 1986. 
Alston distributed to various persons within the bargaining 
unit as well as at least one supervisor a copy of his notice 
of work rule violation, together with his written response 
thereto, which was entitled "N.Y.C. bus driver suspended ten 
days for delaying service, to use toilet after five hours of 
continuous driving." 
On October 9, 1986, Alston was again served with a 
disciplinary notice, imposing a five-day suspension for the 
possession and circulation of this material on Authority 
property. He thereupon filed the instant improper practice 
charges, alleging that the issuance of the October 9. 1986 
disciplinary notice was in violation of the Act. 
The issue before the ALJ. and before us. is whether 
Alston's possession and distribution of the literature 
concerning his disciplinary action constitutes a statutorily 
protected right. If so, his discipline for the exercise of 
that right violates the Act. 
We find that the ALJ correctly construed the material 
distributed by Alston as constituting a communication to 
fellow bargaining unit members about perceived improper 
treatment, as well as a solicitation of bargaining unit 
support for his position that disciplinary action under the 
circumstances was inappropriate and improper. These purposes 
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fall within the proper range of participation in employee 
organization activities and lie within the context of the 
employer-employee relationship. We accordingly agree with 
the ALJ that ALston's activity in this regard was both 
concerted and protected.— 
Having found, under the facts of this case, that the 
distribution of a notice of discipline and Alston's response 
thereto constitutes activity encompassed within the right to 
participate in employee organizational activity, we conclude 
that consequent disciplinary action constitutes coercion and 
interference with such right in violation with §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
Finally, we concur with the finding of the ALJ that the 
Authority's withdrawal of the disciplinary notice following 
the filing of the instant charges does not preclude the 
•1/The Authority asserts that our decision in Dutchess 
County Community College (17 PERB 1F3093 (1984). conf'd sub 
nom Rosen v. PERB. 124 A.D. 657. 20 PERB T7006 (2d Dep't 
1986) (Pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals) requires 
a contrary result. In that case, however, we dealt with 
the question of whether, and to what extent, statutory 
rights are afforded to unrepresented employees. In the 
instant case. Alston was a bargaining unit employee, 
seeking to communicate with and gain assistance from 
bargaining unit members and union officials. The case is 
accordingly distinguished from the case now before us. 
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exercise of our jurisdiction, and is otherwise immaterial, 
except as it impacts upon the remedy to be applied. Alston 
is no longer an employee of the Authority, and since no 
disciplinary action was in fact implemented in connection 
with the at-issue disciplinary charge, the extent of the 
remedy ordered by the ALJ constitutes an appropriate 
2/ disposition of the case.— 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Authority cease and 
desist from interfering with, restraining, coercing or 
discriminating against employees in the exercise of their 
rights under the Act. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all materials pertaining to 
the imposition of disciplinary notice 170-126T-86 be removed 
from any employment or personnel files maintained by the 
Authority or its agents. 
^Alston's original response to the Authority's 
exceptions to the ALJ decision sought affirmance only. He 
subsequently filed an untimely exception to the decision 
seeking monetary relief for his participation in a 
disciplinary hearing for which he was not paid. This 
request for additional relief was not timely argued before 
the ALJ nor timely filed in the form of exceptions or 
cross-exceptions as required by our Rules of Procedure. 
Additionally, no showing of extraordinary circumstances 
excusing the late filing was made. The remedy directed by 
the ALJ must accordingly be affirmed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Authority sign and post 
notice in the form attached at all locations at which notices 
of information to Authority employees are posted. 
DATED: November 24, 1987 
Albany. New York 
<***r£_ /?. 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
z 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees that the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority): 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or 
discriminate against employees in the exercise 
of their rights under the Act; 
2„ Will remove all materials pertaining to the 
imposition of disciplinary notice 179-126T-86 
from any employment or personnel files maintained 
by the Authority or its agent„ 
NEW YORK.CITY. TRANSIT AUTHORITY. 
Dated By (RtprcMntativt) (Tltlt) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2D-11/24/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMERICAN SECURITY CONSULTANTS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and-
NEW YORK CONVENTION CENTER OPERATING 
CORPORATION. CASE NO. C-3253 
Employer. 
-and-
CITY EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 237. 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS. 
Intervenor. 
VLADECK, WALDMAN. ELIAS & ENGELHARD. P.C. (SHELDON 
ENGELHARD. ESQ. of Counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
American Security Consultants Benevolent Association 
(Petitioner) to the decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
its petition seeking to represent certain employees of the 
New York Convention Center Operating Corporation who are 
presently represented by City Employees Union Local 237. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The petition was 
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dismissed by the Director because it was not accompanied, 
when filed, by a declaration of authenticity as required by 
§201.4(d) of our Rules of Procedure.— After having been 
advised that the petition would be dismissed unless it was 
withdrawn. Petitioner filed a declaration of authenticity. 
In its exceptions. Petitioner urges that we determine 
that the filing of a declaration of authenticity pursuant to 
§201.4(d) of the Rules is a technical requirement which was 
•i/Section 201.4(d), as amended effective February 11, 
1985, provides: 
A declaration of authenticity, signed 
and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths, shall be 
filed by the petitioner or movant with 
the director simultaneously with the 
filing of the showing of interest or any 
evidence of majority status for the 
purpose of certification without an 
election, pursuant to section 
201.9(g)(1) of this Part. Such 
declaration of authenticity shall 
contain the following: 
(1) the name of the individual 
executing the declaration, and a 
statement of his authority to execute 
it; if on behalf of an employee 
organization, his position with the 
employee organization, and a statement 
of his authority to execute the 
declaration on its behalf; and 
(2) a declaration that, upon his 
personal knowledge, or inquiries that he 
has made, the persons whose names appear 
upon the evidence submitted have 
themselves signed such evidences on the 
dates specified thereon, and the persons 
specified as current members are in fact 
current members. 
11310 
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substantially met by Petitioner's subsequent filing of a 
declaration of authenticity accompanied by a motion to permit 
its filing nunc pro tunc as of the date of the filing of the 
petition. Petitioner argues that our decision in Town of 
2/ Amherst— supports the conclusion that it has substantially 
complied with the rule. 
We have recently reaffirmed our view that our Rules 
regarding the filing of the showing of interest should be 
3/ 
strictly applied.- That practice should be followed with 
regard to the requirement that a declaration of authenticity 
of the showing of interest be filed simultaneously with the 
petition. Petitioner failed to file any declaration of 
, authenticity with its petition. Such deficiency cannot be 
cured by a subsequent filing accompanied by a nunc pro tunc 
motion. The dismissal of the petition, therefore, was proper. 
Petitioner's reliance on our decision in Town of Amherst 
is misplaced since there we concluded that what the 
petitioner had filed with its petition was in substantial 
compliance with the requirements of §201.4(d) of our Rules. 
thus warranting an extension of time to change substantial 
compliance to complete compliance. Since no declaration of 
2/l3 PERB ir3074 (1980). 
^City School District of the City of Schenectady, 
20 PERB 1P008 (1987) . 
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authenticity was filed simultaneously with the instant 
petition, there can be no finding of substantial compliance. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 24. 1987 
Albany. New York 
^Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/jU€&^£\-
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
1 % 
#2E-11/24/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 74. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
-and- CASE NO. U-9122 
MONTICELLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
MANNING. RAAB. DEALY & STURM. ESQS. (IRA A. STURM. 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
ROSENBERG & UFBERG. ESQS. (SHELDON ROSENBERG. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Monticello 
Central School District (District) to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision that the District violated 
§§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it failed to notify Local 74. Service 
Employees International Union. AFL-CIO (SEIU) regarding the 
disposition of a grievance filed by a bargaining unit member 
on or about September 15, 1986. 
The ALJ made findings of fact as follows. On 
September 15, 1986, Fred Schreier, a maintenance employee 
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with the District, filed a grievance with his supervisor, at 
step one of the grievance procedure, concerning the issuance 
to him of a warning notice on September 3. In response to 
the step one filing. Timothy Corwin. Assistant Superintendent 
for Business, denied the grievance in a letter dated 
September 17. Following receipt of the denial of his 
grievance, Schreier contacted Richard Bennardo, SEIU's 
Business Representative, for assistance. 
Bennardo filed a second grievance, which consisted of a 
restatement of Schreier's original grievance, to Corwin, who 
was the designated step two reviewer under the parties' 
grievance procedure. Following the submission, Bennardo 
contacted Corwin to schedule a meeting to discuss Schreier's 
claims, which was held on October 1, 1986. in Corwin's 
office. When the meeting did not produce any resolution, on 
October 3, Bennardo filed a demand for arbitration, in 
accordance with step three of the grievance procedure. 
_, On October 6, Corwin notified Schreier. in writing, that 
the warning notice which had given rise to the grievances had 
been rescinded and that the grievance should accordingly be 
deemed settled. The District took no steps to communicate 
with SEIU concerning the disposition of the September 3 
warning notice issued to Schreier. After learning from 
Schreier that the issue had been resolved. SEIU filed the 
instant charge. 
11314 
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In support of its exceptions the District argues, among 
other things, that in notifying only Schreier of the 
disposition of his case, and not SEIU, it was merely 
following a multi-year practice of communicating only with 
the party (whether an individual or SEIU) who filed the 
grievance. However, the arguments made by the District in 
support of this contention indicate that the practice existed 
at step one of the grievance procedure, and not at step two. 
In fact, receipt of a response by SEIU at step two triggers 
the filing of a demand for arbitration, which is within the 
exclusive purview of the SEIU. and not of an individual 
grievant. SEIU must, accordingly, be a recipient of step two 
decisions. The October 1 meeting and Corwin's October 6 
letter were, without question, at a step two level. 
The District also argues that it was only responding to 
Schreier1s grievance, and not to Bennardo's grievance, when 
it issued its October 6 letter of disposition. However, that 
Corwin treated the Schreier and Bennardo grievances as one is 
evident from the facts that no separate response was ever 
issued to Bennardo concerning his grievance, and. 
notwithstanding the argument made at and after the hearing in 
this matter, no claim was made by Corwin, during the course 
of the events in question, that the Bennardo grievance was 
untimely or that he had any intention of treating the two 
grievances separately. 
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It thus appears that the Bennardo grievance was merely-
treated as a step two appeal of Schreier's grievance. Based 
upon these findings, the ALJ found that the District owed a 
duty to SEIU to communicate with it concerning a grievance in 
which SEIU had appeared on behalf of. and provided actual 
representation to. a bargaining unit member. 
On the basis of our review of the record in this matter, 
we concur with the factual findings of the ALJ, and confirm 
her conclusion that the failure of the District to 
communicate with SEIU concerning the disposition of a 
grievance in which SEIU had appeared and provided 
representation to the grievant violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) 
of the Act where the District has failed, as here, to 
establish that SEIU has waived its right to receive such 
. ... 1/ 
communication.-
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining 
or coercing unit employees in the exercise of their 
protected Taylor Law rights. 
1/city of Mount Vernon. 5 PERB 1P057 (1972); CSEA v. 
Newman. 88 A.D.2d 685. 686. 15 PERB IROll (3d Dep't 1982). 
appeal dismissed. 57 N.Y.2d 775. 15 PERB ir7020 (1982); City 
of Albany. 16 PERB 1T3101 (1983). 
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Provide the SEIU with notice of the disposition of 
Schreier's grievance filed on September 15, 1986, 
and, unless the parties otherwise agree, henceforth 
notify the SEIU of the disposition of grievances in 
which SEIU has appeared and provided representation 
on behalf of unit employees. 
Negotiate in good faith regarding terms and 
conditions of employment* 
Sign and conspicuously post a notice in the form 
attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate information to unit employees. 
DATED: November 24. 1987 
Albany, New York 
tusCtg?'/T 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l employees of the Monticello Central School 
District in the unit represented by Local 74, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO that the District: 
1. Will not interfere with, restrain or coerce unit 
employees in the exercise of their protected Taylor 
Law rights. 
2. Will provide the SEIU with notice of the 
disposition of Fred Schreier's grievance filed on 
September 15, 1986, and, unless the parties 
otherwise agree, henceforth notify the SEIU of the 
disposition of grievances in which SEIU has 
appeared and provided representation on behalf of 
unit employees. 
3. Will negotiate in good faith regarding terms and 
conditions of employment. 
MONTICELLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By 
(R*pr*MDtativt) (Till*) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST IRONDEQUOIT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8217 
WEST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. 
-and-
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES for the FIRST SUPERVISORY 
DISTRICT OF MONROE COUNTY. 
Intervenor. 
In the Matter of 
WEBSTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. NYSUT. 
AFT. AFL-CIO. LOCAL #3099. 
Charging Party, 
-and-
WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent. CASE NO. U-8220 
-and-
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES for the FIRST SUPERVISORY 
DISTRICT OF MONROE COUNTY, 
Intervenor. 
Board - U-8217, U-8220. U-8222 -2 
In the Matter of 
EAST IRONDEQUOIT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
-and-
EAST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT. 
Respondent. CASE NO. U-8222 
-and-
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES for the FIRST SUPERVISORY 
DISTRICT OF MONROE COUNTY. 
Intervenor. 
JOHN J. MOODY, for West IrondeqUoit Teachers Association 
RUBEN A. CIRILLO, for Webster Teachers Association, 
GILBERT BIANCUCCI. for East Irondequoit Teachers 
Association 
DANIEL R. MOONEY. ESQ., for West Irondequoit Central 
School District 
GREISBERGER. ZICARI. MC CONVILLE. COOMAN. MORIN & 
WELCH. P.C. (DENNIS T. BARRETT. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Webster Central School District and East Irondequoit 
Central School District 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, ESQ., for Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services for the First Supervisory District 
of Monroe County 
ROBERT WRIGHT, ESQ., for New York State Education 
Department, Amicus Curiae 
NORMAN H. GROSS. ESQ. (HENRY F. SOBOTA. ESQ.. of 
Counsel), for New York State School Boards Association. 
Amicus Curiae 
Board - U-8217. U-8220. U-8222 -3 
INGERMAN, SMITH. GREENBERG, GROSS & RICHMOND. ESQS. (WARREN 
H. RICHMOND III. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Board of Cooperative 
Educational Services. Third Supervisory District, Suffolk 
County, Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These matters come to us on the exceptions of the West 
Irondequoit Central School District. Webster Central School 
District and East Irondequoit School District (Districts) and 
of the Board of Cooperative Educational Services for the 
First Supervisory District of Monroe County (BOCES) from 
three decisions issued by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
Marilyn Zahm. Although three separate decisions were issued 
by the ALJ. the, decisions followed a consolidated hearing in 
which all parties participated. These cases have been 
consolidated for decision by this Board upon the ground that 
the facts and circumstances giving rise to the improper 
practice charges are interrelated, and that the legal issues 
presented are virtually identical. 
Briefly stated, the facts in these cases are as 
follows.— In July 1985, the West Irondequoit Teachers 
Association (WITA), the Webster Teachers Association (WTA) 
and East Irondequoit Teachers Association (EITA) (hereinafter 
•i-^A detailed description of the facts in each case is 
fully set forth in the decisions issued by the ALJ at 19 
PERB 1Fir4623, 4612 and 4614. and will not be repeated here. 
Except as may otherwise be indicated in this Decision and 
Order, the facts found by the ALJ in each case are adopted 
here in full. 
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referred to collectively as TAs) filed improper practice 
charges alleging that their respective school districts had 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when they unilaterally contracted out 
the function of providing summer school academic programs for 
1985 to BOCES without negotiation. Prior to 1985, the 
Districts had conducted their own individual academic summer 
2/ 
schools.- the teachers employed to conduct the courses 
offered were already, or became upon employment, members of 
the bargaining units represented by the TAs, and provision 
was made in each agreement for terms and conditions of 
employment of summer school teachers. 
In 1984. the New York State Legislature enacted 
legislation permitting Boards of Cooperative Educational 
Services to provide "academic and other programs and services 
in the school year on a cooperative basis, including summer 
programs and services." (§1950.4 bb Education Law). Prior 
thereto. BOCES did not possess the necessary statutory 
authority to conduct academic summer school programs. 
In 1985, following execution of agreements with the 
Districts and approval of the program by the Commissioner of 
Education, BOCES offered a summer school program to the 
£/During some prior summers, the East and West 
Irondequoit School Districts had taken each other's 
students into their respective summer school programs, but 
that practice ended prior to 1985. 
Board - U-8217. U-8220. U-8222 
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students of all three Districts, consisting of 27 courses to 
students of the three Districts, with an enrollment as 
follows: from Webster Central School District, between 535 
and 595 students; from West Irondequoit Central School 
District, 285 students; and from East Irondequoit Central 
School District. 360 students. Each District paid BOCES on a 
per enrollee basis for each of its students who participated 
in the academic summer school program. The courses provided 
by BOCES in 1985 were no different in scope or content than 
courses offered by the Districts in their regular school 
curricula, and these courses had been offered in different 
years by each of the Districts, although they had never all 
been offered at the same time by any individual District. 
The Districts provided no summer school programs in 1985. 
Notwithstanding the provision by BOCES of a wider 
variety of courses offered simultaneously to a larger number 
of students, the ALJ found that the provision of academic 
summer school courses had been exclusively bargaining unit 
work, that the takeover of the academic summer schools by 
BOCES from the three Districts involved constituted 
contracting out. and that the Districts' actions were not 
taken outside the scope of bargaining by a change in the 
level of service or qualifications for and duties of the work 
to be performed, or by public policy considerations. 
11323 
Board - U-8217. U-8220. U-8222 -6 
We find, first, that the relationship between the 
Districts and BOCES constitutes a contractual relationship, 
despite their contentions that the arrangement was merely a 
3/ 
"sharing of services".— We so find because BOCES is in 
fact and in law a separate entity from the individual school 
districts within its geographical area, having its own staff, 
revenues and operating independence. 
Furthermore, we find that contracting out occurred here 
because the Districts were not divested of the responsibility 
for providing academic summer school courses to their 
students. The Districts did not "get out of the business" of 
providing academic summer school courses to their students, 
but instead paid BOCES on a per enrollee basis, pursuant to 
the terms of written agreements, to perform work which they 
would otherwise have performed themselves. This being so, 
the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 452 U.S. 664. 107 LRRM 2705 
(1981). which held a partial plant closing to be a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining, is inapplicable to this 
case, notwithstanding the arguments of the Districts to the 
contrary. Additionally, to the extent that Otis Elevator II. 
15 LRRM 1281 (1984). may represent an extension of First 
1/Even were we to agree with the Districts that their 
relationship with BOCES was merely a sharing of services, 
we would nevertheless be compelled to conclude that 
bargaining unit work was unilaterally transferred to 
nonunit employees, itself a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
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National Maintenance, supra, and/or a departure from 
Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB. 379 U.S. 203, 57 LRRM 2609 (1964). 
we decline to apply it here. Otis Elevator II indicates that 
subcontracting in the private sector is a mandatory subject 
of negotiations only where the decision to subcontract turns 
upon a reduction of labor costs. 115 LRRM 1281 at 1283. 
However, within our jurisdiction, we have found, and we again 
affirm, that the contracting out of bargaining unit work to 
nonbargaining unit employees is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, and that a reduction in labor costs goes to the 
wisdom of the decision to subcontract only, to be addressed 
during negotiations. See, e.g.. Saratoga Springs CSD. 11 
PERB 1f3037 (1978). conf 'd, 68 A.D. 2d 202. 12 PERB ir7008 (3d 
Dep't 1979). motion for leave to appeal denied. 47 N.Y. 2d 
74. 12 PERB T7012 (1979); City of Poughkeepsie. 15 PERB 1P045 
(1982). conf'd. 95 A.D. 2d 101. 16 PERB 7021 (3d Dep't 1983), 
appeal dismissed. 60 N.Y. 2d 859. 16 PERB T7027 (1983). 
Recognizing, as we have often done, the distinctions between 
public and private sector bargaining laws and policies, we 
deem it appropriate in this case to adhere to the principles 
developed in the line of cases decided by this Board and the 
courts of New York with reference to public sector 
subcontracting. 
The fact that BOCES offered a larger variety of courses 
to a combined larger number of students than had previously 
been offered by each individual District in any prior single 
summer school year does not require the conclusion l l t j ^ 
Board - U-8217. U-8220. U-8222 -8 
that each District had not previously or could not have 
provided educational services to its own students on the same 
. . 4/ 
or a similar scale.— The numbers of students enrolled in 
individual summer school programs in prior years, although 
5/ 
subject to substantial fluctuation.— adequately support a 
finding that the 1985 enrollments in the BOCES program do not 
reflect a meaningful difference in the level or scope of 
services provided, so as to take the BOCES program outside 
the scope of bargaining.— 
In any event, the mere number of enrollees from each 
individual District fails to reveal whether a larger course 
offering caused higher enrollment levels or whether higher 
enrollment levels (resulting from a variety of causes, 
including the Regents' Action Plan) caused the offering of a 
wider variety of courses. It is certainly possible that if 
each individual District had offered a greater range of 
courses, enrollments would have approximated the enrollments 
iL/lt is not seriously argued, and we accordingly do 
not address the argument in any detail, that the courses 
offered by BOCES differed from those offered by the 
Districts in terms of curriculum, nor is it contended that 
the BOCES teachers who taught in 1985 possessed qualifi-
cations or skills different from those possessed by 
District teachers. 
^We note, too, that an overall reduction in student 
enrollment may account in part for the decline in 
enrollment in summer school programs in recent years. 
i^See Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority. 18 
PERB 1P083 (1985); Town of West Seneca. 19 PERB ir3028 
(1986). 
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of students from each individual District who attended the 
1985 BOCES program. The record evidence shows that, 
financial considerations aside, the individual Districts had 
the capacity to offer the same range and number of courses as 
offered by BOCES. The Districts take the position that it is 
not financially feasible to offer a course unless there is an 
enrollment of at least 15 students, and that an enrollment of 
less than 15 means that the course will not be offered. 
Thus, they argue that the BOCES program, which draws its 
enrollment from all three Districts, can offer more courses 
because more courses will be enrolled in by 15 or more 
students. However, this argument is based upon a fiscal 
decision that it would be too expensive to employ a teacher 
to teach a summer school course to a smaller number of 
students. While the Districts are well within their rights 
to reach this financial decision, they may not use it to 
excuse themselves from the duty to bargain their decision to 
subcontract. This financial consideration, like the 
consideration that BOCES-run summer school programs are 
reimbursed at a higher rate by the State and may therefore be 
more financially attractive to the Districts, go to the 
wisdom of the decision to subcontract, and not to whether it 
is subject to bargaining. In essence, the decision to 
subcontract in these cases was a financial one. rather than 
one based upon educational mission. 
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the decision 
by the Districts to utilize BOCES to operate their summer 
school programs in 1985 constituted subcontracting, was 
primarily related to terms and conditions of employment 
rather than formulation or management of public policy, and 
was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining. The 
Districts' failure to bargain with the TAs before 
subcontracting to BOCES constitutes a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act. r 
We have considered the remaining issues raised in the 
exceptions to the ALJ decisions. Those issues were also 
raised before the ALJ and we find that they are fully and 
appropriately addressed and dealt with in her decisions and 
we accordingly adopt the ALJ's reasoning and conclusions here. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the West Irondequoit School 
District. East Irondequoit School District and Webster School 
District: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally subcontracting 
the unit work of the summer school teachers to 
nonunit employees. 
2. Restore all such unit work to unit employees. 
3. Pay unit members any lost wages or benefits suffered 
as a result of subcontracting, plus interest at the 
legal rate, minus interim earnings. 
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Negotiate in good faith with the employee 
organization representing its summer school teachers 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit members. 
Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: November 24. 1987 
Albany, New York 
'Harold E. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe/r 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the West Irondequoit Central 
School District in the unit represented by West Irondequoit 
Teachers Association. NYSUT, AFT. AFL-CIO, that the District: 
1. Will not unilaterally subcontract the unit 
work of the summer school teachers to nonunit 
employees. 
2. Will restore all such unit work to unit 
employees. 
3. Will pay unit members any lost wages or 
benefits suffered as a result of subcontracting, 
plus interest at the legal rate, minus interim 
earnings. 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the 
Association concerning the terms and conditions 
of employment of unit members. 
WEST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By • • • - • • • • • • 
(Rtpr*Mntativt) (Till*) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF f HE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate tha policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Webster School District in the 
unit represented by Webster Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO. Local #3099, that the District: 
1. Will not unilaterally subcontract the unit 
work of the summer school teachers to nonunit 
employees. 
2. Will restore all such unit work to unit 
employees. 
3. Will pay unit members any lost wages or 
benefits suffered as a result of subcontracting, 
plus interest at the legal rate, minus interim 
earnings. 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the 
Association concerning the terms and conditions 
of employment of unit members. 
WEBSTER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
D
*
! e d B y
 <RVpr.wnu'tivt) (Tl'lkj 
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defaced, or covered by any other material. 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and In order to efieetuste the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the East Irondequoit Central 
School District in the unit represented by East Irondequoit 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, that the District: 
1. Will not unilaterally subcontract the unit 
work of the summer school teachers to, nonunit 
employees. 
2. Will restore all such unit work to unit 
employees. 
3. Will pay unit members any lost wages or 
benefits suffered as a result of subcontracting, 
plus interest at the legal rate, minus interim 
earnings. 
4. Will negotiate in good faith with the 
Association concerning the terms and conditions 
of employment of unit members. 
EAST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated By (RsprvMrtativ*) (TIM.) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 3 42, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES. UNITED MARINE 
DIVISION. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3199 
VILLAGE OF BELLPORT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted In the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees, United Marine Division. International 
Longshoremen's Association. AFL-CIO, has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
employer, in the unit described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included; 
Excluded: 
Laborers, Maintenance Mechanic III, 
Auto Equipment Operators, Groundsmen I, 
Custodial Worker I. 
All elected officials. Labor Foreman 
and all other titles. 
FURTHER.- IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees. United Marine Division, International 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 24, 1987 
Albany, New York 
fQ<\ . A/^MT^-* 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
*X—~ * C w 
Walter L. E i s e n b e r g , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA. 
LOCAL 1120. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3258 
TOWN OF SAUGERTIES. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers of 
America. Local 1120, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full and part-time Landfill 
Operators, Landfill Laborers and Animal 
Control Officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Communications Workers of 
America. Local 1120, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 24. 1987 
Albany. New York 
/ Harold R. Newma 
££t*r-*t<^ ~-*T_ 
N n, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg/ Member 
-5—HJlf 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CATTARAUGUS COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3238 
COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. INC. 
LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Cattaraugus County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. "J"! *?Q^ 
Certification - C-3238 page 2 
Unit: Included: Detective Lieutenant, Detective 
Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff Sergeant, 
Deputy Sheriff/Technical Sergeant, 
Deputy Sheriff/Fire Investigator, 
Deputy Sheriff, Emergency Services 
Dispatcher. Correction Sergeant. 
Correction Officer Dispatcher. Cook 
Manager. Correction Officer. 
Dispatcher. STOP-DWI Program 
Coordinator, SeniorCivil Clerk, Pistol 
Permit Clerk. Stenographer and Civil 
Clerk. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Temporary 
Employees, Special Law Enforcement 
Employees, All Employees who work less 
than twenty hours per week. Secretary 
to the Sheriff, Corrections Lieutenant. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Cattaraugus County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 24, 1987 
Albany, New York 
-*-t.<JO( 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
# 3 D - 1 1 / 2 V 8 7 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN ADIRONDACK SUBSTITUTE 
TEACHER ALLIANCE. 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3207 
BOLTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitutes who have 
received a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment, as referenced in 
§201.7(d) of the Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teacher Alliance. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 24, 1987 
Albany, New York 
